Coalitions are usually defined with respect to a static framework of dependencies among agents. In this paper we propose a dynamic view of dependence networks to enable dynamic coalitions which can self adapt to a situation by exploiting the possibility to trigger other agents' goals.
A → 2 G , where G is the complete set of goals. However, in many agent programming languages and architectures, goals are conditional and can be generated. We therefore extend the mind view of [1] with conditional goals.
Definition 1 (Mind view) is represented by the tuple A, G, X, goals : A × 2 X → 2 G , skills : A → 2 X , R : 2 X → 2 G where A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals, X is a set of decisions and R is a set of rules. Figure) A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } and
Example 1 (See
With conditional goals, two kinds of powers can be distinguished: to trigger a goal, and to fulfill it.
Definition 2 (Power view) is represented by the tuple A, G, power − goals : 2 A → 2 (A×G) , power : 2 A → 2 G A set of agents B has the power to see to it that agent a has the goal g, written as (a, g) ∈ power − goals(B), if and only if there are a set of decisions of B such that g becomes a goal of a. A set of agents B has the power to see to goal g if and only if there are a set of decisions of B such that g is a consequence of it.
Definition 3 A, G, power-goals, power is an abstraction from A, G, X, goals, skills, R if and only if:
• (a, g) ∈ power-goals(B) if and only if goals(B) = ∪{skills(b) | b ∈ B} such that g ∈ goals(a,Y ), and
• g ∈ power(B) if and only if ∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that g ∈ R(Y ).
Due to the power to create goals, dependence relations are no longer static but can be created by the agents. We therefore have to extend the dependence networks developed by Conte and Sichman [6] to dynamic ones as in [5] .
Definition 4 (Dynamic dependence view) A dynamic dependence network (DDN) is a tuple A, G, dyndep where A and G are as before, and dyndep : A × 2 A × 2 A → 2 2 G is a function that relates with each triple of a agent and two sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the first depends on the second, if the third creates the dependency.
Abstracting power view to a dynamic dependence network can be done as below. Here, the creation of a dynamic dependency is based only on the power to create goals. In other models, creating a dependency can also be due to creation of new skills of an agent.
is an abstraction of A, G, power-goals, power , if we have H ∈ dyndep(a, B,C) iff 1) ∀g ∈ H : (a, g) ∈ power-goals(C), and 2) H ⊆ power(B).
Example 3 A and G; dyndep(a
We combine these two abstractions, abstracting mind view to a dynamic dependence network as follows.
Proposition 1 A, G, dyndep
is an abstraction of A, G, X, goals, skills, R , if we have H ∈ dyndep(a, B,C) iff 1) ∃Y ⊆ skills(C) such that H ⊆ goals(a,Y ), and 2) ∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that H ⊆ R(Y ) Finally, we define reciprocity based coalitions for dynamic dependence networks. Like in [1] , we represent the coalition not only by a set of agents, as in game theory, but as a set of agents together with a partial dynamic dependence relation. Intuitively, the dynamic dependence relation represents the "contract" of the coalition: if H ∈ dyndep(a, B, D), then the set of agents D is committed to create the dependency, and the set of agents B is committed to see to the goals H of agent a. The rationality constraints on reciprocity based coalitions are that each agent contributes something, and receives something back. • for each agent a ∈ C we have ∃b, B, D, H with H ∈ dyndep (b, B, D) such that a ∈ B ∪ D (agent a contributes either creating a dependency or fulfilling a goal), and
• for each agent a ∈ C ∃B, D, H with H ∈ dyndep (a, B, D) (agent a receives something from C).
Example 4 Coalition C = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 5 }. Agent a 4 is excluded from C because it has a power-goal (the same as a 3 ) but he does not depend on any agent in C.
Summarizing, we define dynamic dependence networks by making the dependence relation conditional to the agents that have the power to create the relation. We distinguish two kinds of power, not only to fulfill goals as in static networks but also the power to create dependencies. Coalitions are defined by "contracts" in which each agent both contributes to and profit from it: the coalition can self adapt to the situation by exploiting -via goal triggering -the dynamics of DNs to exploit opportunities which are not currently present. Further researches are the use of our new theory for coalition formation, e.g., when two agents can make the other depend on itself and thus create a potential coalition? Do these new ways to create coalitions make the system more efficient? Moreover, new measures have to be defined for DDNs, finding inspiration in dynamic SNA.
